Faulty readings before 2009 crash of Air France

PARIS – with faulty instrument readings and alerts the talk in the cockpit fighting confronted the pilot of an Air France jetliner to tame the aircraft as aerodynamic in a stall, rolled left, and finally 38 000 feet, crashed into the Atlantic in just 3 ½ minutes .

But the passengers are dedicated to the fall of Rio de Janeiro-to-Paris flight were asleep probably, or nodding off and knew not what was going on when the plane go nose to the sea, said the director of the French accident investigating the Bureau after reports preliminary data on black-box 1 , 2009, disaster.

All 228 people on board the Airbus A330 died.

The short, highly technical report of the BEA includes only selective comments from the cockpit recorder does not provide analysis and has no debt. It is also not answer the central question: What caused the crash?

But some experts with the report of the co-pilot told the control, at 32 the youngest of the three-man cockpit, Cedric Bonin, wrong can have an emergency response by the nose up, perhaps because he was confused by the false readings.

The plane of the external speed sensors, called pitot tubes, long considered a likely culprit in the disaster, with experts pointing out they may be icy. And the researchers found that BEA was both instruments at the level of different speed readings, with deviations of less than a minute.

Since the accident, Air France has replaced the speed monitors on all Airbus A330 and A340.

An official at Airbus, said the aircraft's nose would have pointed to allow easy down on the level lift again after it had gone into an aerodynamic stall.

"This is part of the overall pilot training aircraft," the official said. He was not authorized to speak on this subject and asked not be identified by name.

Other aviation experts agreed. In raising an aerodynamic stall, a plane loses most often because it runs too slowly, and begins to fall from the sky. Point the nose down allows the aircraft to gain momentum and lift out of the barn.

Pulling the nose "unduly react," to an aerodynamic stall, said Paul Hayes, director of aviation safety for air transport consultancy Ascend Worldwide Ltd. "Either he falsely what was or was confused."

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He warned that Friday's report was brief and that it is unclear how the series of events started.

The flight data recorder and cockpit recorders were dredged from the sea in early May along with a few points.

They showed, in addition to inconsistent speed readings, two co-pilots are working methodically to right the plane stopped manually after auto-pilot. Captain Marc Dubois returned to the cockpit of a routine rest amidst what was moments later, a disastrous situation irretrievable.

After the plane went into a stall warning sounded off the autopilot and auto-thrust as provided closed, and the co-pilot not at the controls "tried several times to call the captain back," the BEA report. The captain returned a minute and 10 seconds later when the plane had climbed to 38,000 feet.

"In the following seconds was all recorded speeds invalid and stopped the stall warning," the report said, but added that the plane never came out of their aerodynamic stall.

"The aircraft was subject to vibrations, the roll sometimes reaches 40 degrees," the report said. The engines never stopped operating and "always responded crew orders," said the BEA.

"The pilots never get in a panic", BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec said on RTL radio, adding that they will maintain professionalism.

The passengers, he said, probably fell to his death, not knowing they were lost.

Dinner was served and "You can imagine that most passengers were asleep or nodding off were," said Troadec. He said the flight attendants never contacted to see the cockpit, which could be wrong.

"They no longer felt movements and turbulence, as you feel in general seems to storms, we think that until the impact they do not realize the situation," said Jean-Baptiste Audousset, president of a victim of the Solidarity union, " which is for the family, what they hear, they do not want to suffer. "

He informed one of a group of representatives of the families who are satisfied with BEA officials on its findings.

At least one expert disagreed with the theory of a soft descent.

Data from the flight recorder shows the plane dropped nearly 11,000 feet per minute (124 mph, or 200 kilometers per hour), inclined to the nose up slightly.

"Eleven-thousand feet per minute is a great sink rate," said Ronan Hubert, the plane crash Record Office is in Geneva. "I would say some of the people aboard would have lost consciousness."

The team had feared turmoil, and more than eight minutes before the crash, the co-pilot at the wheel informed the flight attendant "you should watch out for turbulence ahead. He said the plane could not climb out of the clouds, where the turmoil was going on, because it is not cold enough.

Turbulence caused the pilots to make a slight change of course was, but not excessively, as the plane tried to go through the clouds.

Four minutes later, the plane's autopilot and auto shut off thrust, the stall alarm sounded twice, and the co-pilot at the wheel took over manual control. A second co-pilot, David Robert, 37, was also in the cockpit.

Pilots on long haul flights often stay to rest in turn carefully. After Dubois back into the cockpit, he did not take back the controls.

Just over two minutes before the crash is heard to say Bonin: "I have no clues anymore." Robert says: "We have no valid information."

Michael Barr, the aviation safety professor at the University of Southern California, said the atmosphere in the darkened cockpit would have chaotic: flashing lights, loud alarm, frequent messages.

He compared the pilot emergency-room doctors struggling with a sudden influx of injured patients: They were problems that they had bombed to prioritize quickly.

In addition, they were completely dependent on the information of the aircraft computers gave them.

"You have to rely on your instruments," said Barr. "Therefore, if the instruments do not tell you the truth, you have a hard time deciding what to do. What vote and which are wrong?"

Air France said in a statement that, based on the report, "the original problem was the failure rate of probes for disconnecting the autopilot out" and loss of the pilot schemes.

The airline defended the captain and said he "quickly interrupted his rest period to the cockpit again."

Independent aviation analyst Chris Yates said the report shows "more questions than answers."

"It seems to me to read between the lines, that the cockpit crew confident that the information they presented was displayed on the data," said Yates. "Perhaps – and perhaps only – they took some measures that led to the stall warning and the aircraft stalling and then not be able to correct it."

A new, but not final report with some analysis to be issued in July.

More Source:

Nation & World | Faulty readings ahead of 2009 Air France crash ...
Airbus A330-202 Crash News, Photos and Videos - ABC News
Speed sensors failed in 2009 Air France crash
Air France Flight 447 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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